Franquias de alimentos e coordenação de cadeias agroindustriais: uma análise empírica

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Revista de Administração (USP), São Paulo, v. 37, n. 1, p. 51-62. 2002. http://www.rausp.usp.br 
Abstract: Franchising is an important trend in business contracting, playing a special role in te food sector. It is well know the funtion of franchising as a governance struture of the transaction between franchiser and franchisee (forward coordination). This paper, instead, investigates the backward coordination induced by foodfranchising. The main hypothesis states that the choice of governance struture depends on the quality strategy adopted by franchisers. This occurs because, under certain conditions, quality strategies imply higher asset specificity or higher uncertainty. As a consequence, quality strategies may induce the adoption of hybrid forms (or even vertical integration) instead of spot markets. In order to test the above hypothesis, this paper presents a discrete strutural analysis of six franchising cases in the Brazilian market: four coffee shops and two fast-food services. The main TCE predictions are confirmed: higher asset specificity and higher uncertainty are associated to governance structures that provide more control. Some of the results, nevertheless, are better explained by historical elements (path dependence).

 

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  1. Tilly

    Thanky Thanky for all this good informaiotn!

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